In the year 2024....

Regarding my conclusion that the U.S. would not be pulling out of Afghanistan anytime soon, and for reasons far broader than Afghanistan itself, here is reporting on an agreement between the U.S. and Afghan President Karzai that would allow U.S. boots on the ground until 2024. This blogger ends by comparing Karzai's "capitulation" to the United States with the U.S. "literally begging al-Maliki for permission to keep their troops in Iraq for just one more year."

what's next....

For now "what's next" is getting back to my classes, online and in class.  Week 2 of the semester kicking up tomorrow.  In my senior International Relations class we're reading excerpts from classic works, beginning with The Melian Dialogue from The History of the Peloponnesian War  by Thucydides. I even discovered The Melian Dialogue has own Facebook page!  It only took 2400 years!  The powerful Athenians send a delegate to inform the people of Melos that they would suffer tremendously, ethnic cleansing as we would say today, if they did not surrender and declare allegiance to the Athenian Empire. The Melians, stupefying the Athenians, decline to surrender. They have the support of the gods, and the Spartans, should they face a threat as the Athenians were proposing.  In the months that follow, the Melians make a few tactical strikes against the Athenians, but the Empire keeps its word and society on Melos is violently disassembled.

In my new online class, HIST 4980: Special Topics in Multinational Peacekeeping, the students are currently learning the difficulties of conceptualizing peace operations, much less building generalized theory from a wide diversity of individual cases.  After a few introductory chapters we'll look back at crises in Suez, Congo, Vietnam, Afghanistan (x2) and others.

 As for this blog, I have a couple ideas I'll work out over the next few days. I have the opportunity to present papers at upcoming conferences, and so the blog is intended to get me in the habit and spirit of writing again after too long a time.  Coming soon......

Time to check on the students and see how they're doing.  Have a great week, everyone.

Wrap up

To tie up some loose ends on this series before moving on, I return to Air Force Col. Larry D. New,  and his 1996 summary of Clausewitz's Trinity --

"Trinitarian war consists of  “the inherent linkage between the nature of war, the purpose of war, and the conduct of war. Clausewitz called this linkage a paradoxical trinity with three aspects: the people, the commander and his army, and the government. The people have to do with the nature of war, the military with the conduct of war, and the government with the purpose of war.” (New 1996)

In reference to the Trinity, Cpl. New states, "this paper uses the purpose as the ends, the nature as the means, and the conduct as the techniques applied in war"  As he points out, the nature of war is the most problematic.

New does nice work summarizing the core dilemma: 

"The purpose of war is a principle we have had problems with since the end of World War II. At that time, our entire nation understood and supported the national reaction and goals after a direct and deliberate attack on America. We seem to have an aversion to articulating the desired end state when making the decision to use the military as an instrument of national policy. Initial air-war planners for the Gulf War assumed political objectives from pieced-together speeches and statements made by President George Bush. These gained legitimacy and were adopted in toto as they were briefed up the chain of command ultimately to the president."

 

He posits that the ambiguity common to decision-making in electoral democracies is responsible, and it's a valid point. Certainly no president wants military failure or folly on his/her watch for any reason, including political ramifications. But this explanation does not take into consideration the notion that a particular military operation is not well articulated by the political decision-makers because they lack the vocabulary to do so, as do their advisors and the academics trying to sort it all out. Or perhaps I should say there is too much vocabulary, too many choices and a great need for understanding how all parties define the conflict, not just the United States.  To pick up from Kolenda, there are numerous ways of perceiving the many conflicts within the many Afghanistans with which we are confronted. 

There is wide agreement that in Trinitarian terms the nature of war is linked to the people, as the conduct of war is to the military and the purpose of war to the government.  However, what Clausewitz means, precisely, by nature is unclear, especially, as New points out, because Clausewitz also uses the words kind and character, not to mention issues of translation. Clausewitz is often quoted on his insistence that decision-makers know what kind of war they're getting into in order to secure public support and to communicate accurately with the generals.  The purpose of war cannot be justified if one refers to a mistaken view of the war's nature. Defining the nature of war more precisely, however, goes to the heart of my conclusions on the Westphalian Question, so to speak.  For years the distinction between total (absolute) war and limited war was most common, then the advent of weapons of mass destruction raised the issue of "conventional" versus "unconventional {enter WMD of your choice here}; the offense-defense debates of deterrence theory, and the return of asymmetric war, the rise of cyber-war, and the application of transformational revolutions in military affairs are all further examples of attempts to define the nature of wars.

Further fogging the picture is the linkage of war's nature to the people on whose behalf government is defining and the military is fighting war.  Just how do the American people see the nature of our conflict in Afghanistan, or elsewhere? How invested in the sacrifices of the troops are they?  They have certainly been told that the expected outcome is in line with a state-centric emphasis, that Afghanistan will be left to itself when it is a state capable of resisting insurgency and terrorism to an acceptable degree, or the status quo will continue and/or Afghanistan declines into the "failed state" category altogether.  And, indeed, this is the model on which the COIN strategy is being implemented, and as New argues, Clausewitz remains applicable.  What about the people of Afghanistan? In the interview of "C" by Gen. Warner, the implication seems to be that the war is the primary obstacle, not means, of getting what they want, i.e., to be left alone.  Perhaps an effective forcefulness by the Afghan National Army in combination with negotiations about post-conflict governance and power-sharing can compel the Haqqani and other networks to halt armed conflict, at least in the short term, but beyond that, C's call for abandoning counter-insurgency and essentially leaving Afghanistan to its own vices to work out.

Col. New is of course right in saying that the policymakers need to do a better job defining the nature of wars, certainly more so than in, as he points out, Korea and Vietnam.  But is it enough to define a war as asymmetric, for example?  Certainly, if the situation meets the definition, the accurate rendering will more likely lead to successful outcomes. In Afghanistan, however, if we accept that "C" had valuable insights to offer even if he may be underestimating the potential for at least moderately successful state-building, then we are well served by thinking of armed conflict in post-Westphalian terms, a line of thought not easily established because there are many variables and gray zones, however, we may find along the way a more accurate way of knowing the nature of wars.  Consider earlier examples where I pointed out the ease and comfort with which insurgency is the accepted depiction of the situation in Afghanistan, involving varied terrorist-related tactics but ultimately the insurgent model fits U.S. and NATO's view of the conflict.

What changes if we instead apply C's definition of the conflict as one of civil war?  One wishes the interviewer had solicited more detail on this topic.  An insurgency can be part of a civil war, of course, but one gets the feeling that C was not (or not only) broadening the scope of conflict as much as reconceptualizing it as a conflict involving different motives among the combatants than as conceived by the insurgency model.  The ongoing competition among disaggregated networks -- tribal, business, criminal -- and the infiltration of foreign fighters and illicitly imported weapons raises the question of who are the insurgents and against whom are they surging. If we focus tightly on the Taliban and al Qaeda, it's easy to surmise that they are the insurgents trying to get back into power.  But any return to circa 1996 is unthinkable. Still, the point is that even if the west "defeats" the Taliban militarily, most of the same problems plaguing state-building today would still plague Afghanistan, perhaps even more.  A central power-sharing government and multiple semi-autonomous regions dividing governance functions among them is an easily grasped endgame, unless you're talking about Afghanistan.  Well, as I have said, I'm not saying the west will pull out of Afghanistan, leaving behind neither a high functioning state nor a stateless, borderless tribal zone in its place.

Col. New is spot on with his comments about the purpose of war becoming "detached from the
conduct of war when the purpose changes without a corresponding reevaluation and adjustment in the conduct."  His use of Somalia circa 1993 is on target as well.  But what of the nature of post-Westphalian war?  Are we of a mind to understand localized conflicts apart from their "national" contexts, indeed, increasingly divorced from state-based war as time goes on?  Areas like Afghanistan and the Sinai and Saudi deserts are becoming home to fighters for whom sovereign state governance is not on the radar except to the degree that current sovereigns are the enemy.  As basic resources such as water become increasingly scarce and peoples are increasingly displaced across national boundaries, the opportunity for exploiting their anarchy and need is not lost on criminal and transnational terrorist organizations.  However, when it comes to defining the nature of a particular situation, western leaders are more inclined to do so with familiar terms -- it's a failed state, or a state sponsor of terrorism, or a state in need of development, diplomacy, justice and reconciliation.  But outside of fantastical propaganda touting the goal of a worldwide caliphate, where is the evidence that statehood is the primary concern of the victims of war in Afghanistan? Or even that of the "insurgents"?

In other words, when applying Clausewitz's Trinitarian framework of war's nature, purpose and conduct, we are now confronted with a much more difficult task than when we could apply it to a state's clearly defined population, government and military.  In the "new wars," determining the nature of the war cannot be clouded by the shadow of the past when the nature of war was defined primarily by the capabilities of the well organized combatants -- conventional or unconventional weapons, parity or asymmetry of capabilities, land or sea or air power, etc.  The array of ethnic, tribal, criminal and governmental actors in cross-cutting conflicts in Afghanistan present a much more complex picture, for example, in which tribal leaders and followers do sometimes diverge (as Kolenda points out) as priorities and opportunities diverge.  From the western perspective, the nature of the war is an insurgency against a government and people who desire stable statehood.  The purpose of the insurgents is to recapture Taliban control of the central government and the purpose of the counter-insurgency is to to defeat the Taliban and its allies, largely by turning the population of Afghanistan against the insurgency.  The insurgents are conducting the war by employing a wide range of tactics and government (in theory) conducts warfare supported internationally by a growing security force that will eventually be in charge of sustaining security and stability in Afghanistan. Ultimately it's a Clausewitzian model of warfare applied to a Westphalian solution, using decidedly different strategies and tactics than the Soviets in the 1980s, but from the same model of statecraft as war.

The Neo-Medievalist position offers us a chance to view the nature, purpose and conduct of the war from alternative perspectives.  However, the results remain uncertain.  In 2008 Foreign Affairs published an article that's worth returning to in light of the years that have passed, "A Tribal Strategy for Afghanistan," by Greg Bruno.  He links a very helpful map that illustrates the tribal breakdown in Afghanistan. One point that is emphasized strongly in this article is the problem highlighted by Kolenda and others -- that the notion of a well managed tribal structure in Afghanistan is too optimistic.  As mentioned earlier, decades of war have taken their toll on traditional structures, created warlords, criminals, and shifting allegiances as people's security environment changes. Neo-Medievalism offers interesting insights into the nature of changes occurring in Afghanistan, but it only explains the situation to the degree that the disaggregated governance it foresees comes to be, and actually works. To boil it down to its core, what I'm saying is that the people of Afghanistan will not be left alone.

We're ultimately left with two alternative futures.  Either the situation in Afghanistan will continue on the current path without reaching a significant end of U.S. military presence, in part because U.S. military presence in Afghanistan is part of a strategy far larger than Afghanistan and in part because the domestic situation in Afghanistan justifies it.  This is not to say there won't be amendments to agreements and adjustments such as increased reliance on Special Operations Forces.  The alternative is that the United States does withdraw its presence comprehensively (perhaps deploying them elsewhere, however) based on confidence in the Afghan government's ability to maintain security and stability.  The nature of governance in this stabilized Afghanistan is unknown as of now, at least beyond vague expectations that power-sharing negotiations can produce the necessary conditions for stability.  The more relevant point is that this condition would mean the end of U.S.-led counter-insurgency operations.  Civilian aid agencies and NGOs would pick up where military joint task forces left off, etc.  A workable agreement with the Taliban would go a long way toward this goal, but would prove to be only one necessary piece of the puzzle, not the whole.

But besides (hopefully) relief for many armed forces and their families, what might a comprehensive withdrawal from Afghanistan mean for U.S. national security strategy more broadly?  What are our interests in Central Asia, South Asia, and Eurasia most broadly? I'll consider these issues in future posts.  For now, the Westphalian/Clausewitzian model of warfare will continue to guide western solutions to foreign crises, many of which have strong Post-Westphalian/Neo-Medievalist qualities. The Pentagon will continue to publish Field Manuals that illustrate an understanding of the changing nature of war, of the significance of identity politics and the fluidity thereof, and of the challenges of state-building.  However, gaps in intelligence gathering, analysis and exploitation in addition to a propensity to stick with what one knows best will continue to plague our ability to accurately define the nature of localized conflicts.  This is particularly important as we approach great and rapid political change in the Arab world.

Converations with History: An excellent interview series (in 28th year)

http://conversations.berkeley.edu

Clausewitz v. Neo-Medievalism, Part 3.2: Afghanistan as a Westphalian challenge to the United States

General Warner's interview of "C" is followed by "Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level: A Rejoinder to Volney F. Warner and 'C;," by Colonel Christopher D. Kolenda, who states about his authorship of the article: "I do so as a Soldier serving in Afghanistan. The sentiments here are entirely my own and should not be attributed in any way to the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force." (25) My summary of this article is coming next.

Col. Kolenda aptly summarizes C's views, and states that he agrees with the ultimate outcomes that C prefers, i.e, an end to terrorist threats emanating from a poorly or non-governed failed state. He goes on to say that it is the "assessment of the problem and the prescriptions for the way ahead, however, are where we differ." (25)

Col. Kolenda begins with some brief questions (p.26)

"First of all, is Afghanistan truly governable, or must it be governed in an Afghan way?" Here Kolenda points to forty years of statehood in the mid-20th century as evidence that a modern government is possible. However, the author (as I discuss later) also is very convincing on the notion that more recent and persistent conflict over the last thirty years has altered traditional society in many challenging ways; such instability was not the case during the decades of the 20th century Afghan monarchy.

"Second, does one's identity as a member of the Suk-dari clan of the Nuristani Kom tribe, for instance, exclude identity as an Afghan? Or can one hold several identities at once? If not, where does the exclusion begin -- between clan and tribe, between tribe and ethnicity, or between ethnicity and national identity?" Kolenda goes on to cite a survey by the International Republican Institute from 2009, in which "78% of respondents considered themselves 'Afghan' first."

"What evidence do we have that the insurgent forces invade from Pakistan rather than being resident within Afghanistan itself?" This is asked in the context of Kolenda's challenge to the view that a counter-terrorist strategy is preferable to counter-insurgency with its nation-building challenges (a view to which he subscribes "C", though I do not think C uses the exact term counter-terrorist strategy, but the characterization is not unfair).

"Is government by warlords or tribal strongmen actually feasible in Afghanistan?" to which Kolenda firmly replies, "Afghans roundly reject warlord empowerment....Thirty years of warfare and social atomization have crippled the large traditional structures so badly that rule by tribal strongmen is no longer possible. But certainly the governance that will work in Afghanistan must be one that enfranchises, builds on, and adapts traditional systems in appropriate ways." (emphasis in original)

And finally, "Is a CT (counter-terrorist) approach feasible without basic law enforcement, governance, and security institutions, or is it just another example of playing 'whack-a-mole' to no enduring effect?"

He does agree that radical propaganda must be countered, for example, stating that "supporting moderate madrassas inside Afghanistan as alternatives is critically important."

The next passage from Kolenda;s piece is worth quoting in light of my quoting C on his time spent with and affection for the people of Afghanistan:

"Like C, I have grown to love the Afghan people, having spent the better part of the past 2 1/2 years in-country working closely with elders and villagers. That I see things differently than C is not surprising. There are many Afghanistans -- the rich tapestry of the society and culture conveys different meanings to different observers depending on their perspectives, biases, and agendas. Too often, observers see the Afghanistan they want to see and ignore the others that do not conform. This complexity is part of what makes Afghanistan so fascinatingly difficult and so potentially perilous." (26)

Kolenda then offers a very helpful delineation of "five destabilizing and mutually reinforcing factors" besetting Afghanistan: "(1) localized violence, struggles for power, and social unrest fomented by indigenous militants who are exploited by (2) larger insurgent groups whose senior leadership resides in Pakistan, such as the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, and the Haqqani network that are enabled by (3) al Qaeda and affiliated with transnational terrorist networks, all supported and sustained by (4) narcotrafficking, criminality, smuggling, and international financiers. These four symptomatic factors coexist within an ongoing (5) socioeconomic upheaval and political disaffection that form the root causes of attraction to insurgency."(26) Take note of the assured used of the term insurgency in contrast to C's civil war. In Kolenda's formulation above, insurgency is but one set of networked actors and activities in the AfPak region. Insurgent organizations exploit local conflicts while depending on external support from transnational criminal and terrorist organizations in a socioeconomically challenged and wartorn region.

According to my reading of C's insights, the multiple, multi-layered and mostly disaggregated conflicts as summarized by Kolenda are indicative of the non-Westphalian nature of "Afghanistan." Indeed, I do not think it's going too far to speculate that C would say that withdrawing western forces (most likely after an uptick in counter-terrorist strikes) would allow traditional governance and justice structures to deal with the criminal market and terrorists in search of safe havens.

Ultimately, I find myself more convinced by Kolenda's arguments, without, however, diminishing respect for C's experience and insight, and indeed I believe the factors that C highlights are important checks on Kolenda's views. I think there are minor problems with Kolenda's rejoinder to specific points made in Warner's interview of C, but overall, his argument about the current status of the traditional structures that C emphasizes is quite convincing. An example, under the subheading of "Problematic Thesis" (referring to C's thesis): "The collapse of social cohesion and fragmentation of tribal integrity in the Pashtun areas make any silver-bullet solution to govern Afghanistan by tribal strongmen and powerbrokers a dangerous anachronism. Many of these individuals have been included in the government in an attempt to gain support among their populations. The fact that their tribal brethren are still involved in the insurgency speaks volumes about the waning power of the so-called strongmen and powerbrokers.." (28)

In sum, I find Kolenda a bit too optimistic about the possibility of success in Afghanistan, defined as "A reasonable degree of security in which insurgents no longer pose an existential threat to the state, and the country can protect its sovereignty...." For one thing, as I'm sure Kolenda would acknowledge, this is a sweeping statement that covers a lot of ground, that is, leaves a good deal unsaid. Still, while acknowledging the difficulty of reaching this end-state, Kolenda clearly feels that staying the COIN course will result in a functioning state; I find this to be a generational question, and have my doubts bout the American will to support it. However, as I said, I do appreciate his analysis of what decades of war have done to traditional structures as a response to C's assertion, or at least implication, that traditional decision-making structures were capable of effective self-governance without continued U.S. counter-insurgency/nation-building efforts. There are many additional variables that make me hesitant to support a rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan, or to expect that it will happen, most having to do with regional geopolitics, tossing in American domestic politics a wild card into the mix. For example, the U.S. national security policy community needs to specify American policy towards the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, comprised as it is by seven nations in the region, including Russia and China, with India and Iran on the periphery looking in as well. I don't see why Afghanistan would not join the SCO if invited, and why China and Russia would pass up the chance to annex Afghanistan into their orbit. Energy geopolitics, India-Pakistan relations, and other factors also fog one's ability to envision the United States abandoning its investment in Afghanistan, which has given the United States its first land-locked military foothold in the region.

Returning to more generalized conclusions, long-term considerations should be given to how this murky world condition of non-state empowerment affects U.S. policymakers' ability to accurately interpret 21st century conflicts (barring a return to great power war). When transnational terrorist agendas are combined with shifting identities of populations coming into contact with global forces, whether commercial, conflictual, criminal or otherwise, the predictability of state sovereignty may be lost in a neo-medieval fragmentation of political authority, especially if statehood has traditionally been challenged in the past. Modeling one's response to such events without letting go of a strictly Westphalian/state-centric/Clausewitzian war-as-policy paradigm leads one to establish expectations, priorities and strategies in ways that may leave out vital perspectives and agendas. Fortunately, few situations in the globe, if any, are comparable to Afghanistan beyond general similarities involving some level of ethnic conflict, religious militancy and criminal enterprise as key features. However, one looks at the tribal based society in Libya and wonders what fate the post-Kaddafi era will bring.

There will continue to be a state of Afghanistan, with all the trappings of diplomatic privileges for a few; whether it will be a state that can actually govern, much less survive, and not develop into a threat to American interests, are very open questions. The United States will likely maintain a military presence, though there may be continually evolving status of forces agreements, unless the American people make clear a consensus for full withdrawal.

There is a huge and growing literature on the topics covered in these posts.  Indeed, the current issue of Joint Force Quarterly contains a section of five articles on counter-insurgency alone. The two viewpoints I quoted were mere samples I chose and were intended as representative, not definitive, perspectives.  All comments welcomed.

Clausewitz v. Neo-Medievalism, Part 3.1: Afghanistan as a post-Westphalian challenge to the United States

With the semester formally underway and smoothing out, I can finally return and complete the three-part essay I'm offering; Part Three, however, will be offered in 2 parts, beginning here. I am seeking to reach a conclusion about what happens when (1) U.S. Policy in Afghanistan is viewed from a Westphalian, state-centric perspective, with important modifications acknowledged but, ultimately state-based solutions are seen as preferable by the United States, and (2) the armed conflicts in Afghanistan are viewed from a post-Westphalian, Neo-Medievalist perspective, emphasizing not only the non-state actors involved in the conflict, but more broadly the non-state nature of society in what we call Afghanistan. Part 3.1 will for my purposes represent the Neo-Medievalist view; Part 3.2 will represent the Westphalian/Clausewitzian view as well as offer tentative conclusions.

I offer the views of two greatly experienced individuals as expressed in the professional magazine, Joint Force Quarterly in 2010. The journal is freely accessed online through the National Defense University, where it is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (having been inaugurated by CJCS Colin Powell). The first is featured in an article by retired Army General Volney F. Warner. In "Afghanistan: Context and What's Next," Gen. Warner writes that he is neither experienced with nor an expert on Afghanistan nor the various ethnic, religious, and tribal populations that make up Afghanistan and the broader region. Therefore, he interviews "C", a person with over 30 years experience in Afghanistan and its cultures, but whose name cannot be revealed. Warner simply offers that, "He has an extensive background in the Intelligence Community, Department of Defense, and the defense industry." (19) Warner explains the purpose of his interview: "As one who believes in preemptive peace more than preemptive war, I have over the past months peppered him with questions that would enable me to better comprehend the nuances of the war in Afghanistan. Do we have a clear understanding of what 'winning' means? What does it mean to the region? What does it mean to the Afghan people? What would be the consequences of negotiating a political settlement enforceable by the region's interested powers?" (19)  The views of C are representative of a post-Westphalian realization that the state is not always the best form of socio-political organization.

In his responses to Warner's questions, C reveals much about the people of Afghanistan and their worldview. He emphasizes a couple of key points that I will highlight by excerpting his comments.I rely on extensive quotes.

C's fundamental thesis is exemplifed here: "Over these many years, I have come to care for the Afghan people, their way of life, and their compelling desire to be left alone to their form of civilization. I appreciate how they settle disagreements and how personal rights and wrongs from many generations ago have colored their outlook today. Whether they are termed tribal leaders or 'warlords,' the government they have is largely the government they know and want. This is a point that those who attempt to judge without understanding the culture mostly miss. It is akin to the facile view of too many academics prone to believe that Afghanistan is a conventional nation-state. It is not! Some of us who have lived with the Afghans know that it qualifies as a country, defined as a parcel of real estate with people. These are people who have little desire for social or economic intercourse with strangers because history has convinced them that such interchanges only benefit the stranger....Consider that there are no roads because the Afghans are a private people and do not want to share their land or be imposed upon to offer Islamic hospitality to strangers. What would visitors bring besides disruption to a lifestyle practiced over thousands of generations? History confirms this." (19)

Later, C continues with the point: "It has escaped and continues to escape the idealists and the new COIN practitioners who are eager to prove their convictions that Afghanistan has only exhibited the characteristics of a nation when it was under autocratic rule. At all other times, the tribes lived their own lives; plied their trades; swapped foodstuffs, raw materials and products; and made some AFAs [afghani, the unit of currency] off of tourists. This is their way of life, even with the Taliban present in some of the provinces." (20)

On counter-insurgency (COIN): "A point that the COIN [counter-insurgency] aficionados and the neophytes in the new U.S. administration is that we do not have an insurgence in Afghanistan; rather, it is a civil war." (19)

On what the US needs to do: "We need to bring our Afghan enterprise to a close quickly and in a manner that gives some hope of future stability without further alerting the Afghans." (19)

Further on this point:

"I reject COIN as a workable solution over the long run unless the United States wants to rent Arabs and Pashtun for the foreseeable future. I say 'rent' because we cannot buy them." (20)  He clearly believes this applies not only to Afghanistan, but to Iraq as well: "Going into Iraq was a terrible miscalculation; Iraq is not a national entity, but another Yugoslavia cobbled together as a quick and dirty solution by Western interests -- and it will balkanize after we leave." (20)

"I am very pessimistic about attempts to bring about a unified national entity in Afghanistan that most Afghans would place above their village and tribes. The best I can see is a federation of tribes -- a kind of medieval Poland -- where borders, land, and water-sharing are clearly spelled out." (22)

"Most of the Afghans I speak with barely acknowledge, if at all, President [Hamid] Karzai as other than a Western puppet. Whatever he embraces, they will not." (22)

The final paragraph: "My experiences living with the Afghans yield a totally different take than the news media's pro-Karzai attitude and wat we face in "nationbuilding." It's high time the American people were faced with the reality of what Afghanistan is not and what it will cost in national resolve, blood, and treasure to realize their politicians' idealism. Alice's wonderland is a closer reality, and I say this knowing and loving the Afghan people." (24)

You should read the article for yourself, as there is a good deal more valuable information and insight, for example, regarding Pakistan and C's ideas on the need for immediate and extensive PSYOP programs. C's opposition to counter-insurgency and nation-building in favor of an approach more akin to counter-terrorism are the basis of what he sees as the necessity for strong action to create conditions ripe for our departure. He puts forth in clear terms his determination that ruthless demonstrations of strength against terrorists is a necessary ingredient of strategy, and cites two examples that make his point without question (parental discretion advised):

"The Soviets had the right solution to terrorism when four of their diplomats were kidnapped in Lebanon by Hizballah 23 years ago. The KGB kidnapped six fundamentalists and sliced off a few fingers, sending the severed digits to the fundamentalist leadership with the message 'release our people or you'll get yours back piece-by-piece and more to follow. In the 1970s when terrorists attempted to skyjack a Royal Ethiopian Airlines flight, they were overcome by the flight crew and first-class passengers. They were moved to tourist class, and the skyjackers were beheaded. The crew radioed Addis Ababa to call the world press, and upon landing the pilot walked out with the heads of the skyjackers and kicked them down the stair ramp, saying, 'This is how we handle terrorists.'" (20)

When Gen. Warner then asks C, "But then why did we not eliminate the Taliban and pursue bin Laden and company into Pakistan when we had the chance?" His response points to the "ill-conceived and unplanned venture" in Iraq that removed troops from General McChrystal and diverted the "strategic threat vision" to OIF. (20-21)

C's preference for counter-terrorist strategies is critiqued by the following article.

******************************************************************************

General Warner's interview of "C" is followed by "Winning Afghanistan at the Community Level: A Rejoinder to Volney F. Warner and 'C;," by Colonel Christopher D. Kolenda, who states about his authorship of the article: "I do so as a Soldier serving in Afghanistan. The sentiments here are entirely my own and should not be attributed in any way to the leadership of the International Security Assistance Force." (25) My summary of this article is coming next.

Part Two: Whither the State: Neo-Medievalism and Post-Modern War

People across the globe have always organized themselves in widely varied ways, from families and villages through civil society organizations and the sovereign state itself, and the sovereign state system as well.  Over the past four centuries the sovereign state system has grown geographically, normatively and institutionally into a globally common institution.

These centuries have also seen a fluid ebb and flow of non-state, politically influential institutions and even individuals with outsized influence on the course of events.  However, the state – a category of actor with unique attributes as opposed to the vastly generic “non-state” designation for any actor not a state – was clearly the winning concept, as all global relations became subsumed within the context of the sovereign state system.  The parallel and often crosscutting cultural forces – language, religion, ethnicity and nationality – added many layers of complexity (read: in-group/out-group and intra-group conflict).  Indeed, for decades scholars have debated the impact of these forces on the sovereign state system, with varying emphasis on the fragmentation of states, the integration of states, the privatization of state functions and the increasingly porous line between public and private sectors, and the persistence of failed statehood.  Global governance, global terrorism, global capitalism at the macro level plus tribal-sectarian fragmentation at the micro level equals….or approximates a new reality for the state as the necessarily central actor in world affairs. 

Neo-medievalism proposes that the current crop of non-state actors and conflicts represent a qualitative step in the decline of the sovereign state system, and envisions the Westphalian system replaced by multiple overlapping sovereignties and overlapping loyalties analogous to the European Middle Ages.  Such a system lacks the clear demarcation of authority we find in the state-centric system (which is why we call it state-centric).  Consider the multitude of city-states, kingdoms, principalities and even the notion of “Christendom” that defined medieval European politics.  In a neo-medieval international system, to borrow from Yeats, the center cannot hold.

That is to say, states in their modern definition would continue, though the issue-areas a centralized government has to deal with will continue to make sovereignty a porous cloth to be managed as opposed to a firm walled structure.  People's loyalties and identities are decreasingly exclusive and discrete and increasingly fungible among multiple institutions that facilitate the management of one's life.  Corporations, tribes, religious sects, cyber-communities, insurgent/terrorist/criminal gangs are just a few broad examples, each subject to further decentralization. The individual is empowered, whether the CEO of a global corporation or an insurgent planting an IED.

One argument challenging neo-medievalism is this:  Previous examples of state fragmentation were certainly challenges for the state(s) in question, but not to the norm and institution of statehood.  After years of internal strife, Kosovo seceded from Serbia, but the goal and result is a new state.  The savagery seen in Rwanda was in part a result of provocations emanating from the state, raising obvious moral questions but not directly threatening the state system. At the macro (or at least regional) level, the ongoing troubles facing integration as well as the severe limitations on combined warfare facing NATO illustrate the persistence of state based institutions even after sixty years of Euro-Atlantic institution-building.  In sum, the realm of politically active and influential actors is greatly more diverse and globalized than before, but the sovereign state system remains the basis for legitimacy and authority.

Here are three articles that caution against expecting significant transformation of the international system rather than within it:

Ole Waever, “Identity, Integration and Security: Solving the Sovereignty Puzzle in E.U. Studies,” Journal of International Affairs 48 (2) Winter 1995.

John G. Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” International Organization 47 (1) Winter 1993: 139-174.

J.G. Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neo-Realist Synthesis,” World Politics 36 (2) Spring 1983: 261-285.

I tend to agree with this point of view, not surprising given my Realist tendencies.  The

state does remain a significant organizing principle whose dividends continue to outweigh liabilities for a great portion of the world’s population. However, we can learn from neo-medievalism, as it seems blindingly obvious to me that the sovereign state system is simply not suitable for all the world’s population.  This has always been so, but the question for us now is whether such trends are growing and having greater global impact.  To focus my analysis to its core, my questions regard the decade long U.S. effort in Afghanistan and its implications for 21^st century conflict and U.S national security strategy.

A neo-medieval proposition would be that the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan is based on a faulty political premise.  This is very important given the consensus among all serious thinkers that the conflicts of Afghanistan can only be solved socio-politically, not militarily.   Whether the military strategy is mostly counter-terrorism (CT) or counter-insurgency (COIN), the ultimate goal is a sovereign Afghan state.  Not even the most ardent supporter of U.S. policy thinks Afghanistan will become a state constituting high functioning legislative and administrative institutions and a supportive civil society.  And certainly the most ardent neo-medievalist would acknowledge Afghanistan’s history of state sovereignty – threatened almost continuously from within and from without but unquestionably a member of the international system, as officially it is now.  But in between the two – between modern statehood and some greatly decentralized, tribal-based governance structure – is the battlespace.  Throughout the Department of Defense the requirements for total battlespace dominance are debated in terms of force structures and geospatial technology bringing the rapidly advancing information age to warfare like never before.  In traditional state-on-state warfare, these resources are used to discover, predict and counter the enemy state’s military application of policy (as Clausewitz would say).  The ability to successfully dominate the Afghan battlespace and reach the goal of a U.S. friendly, non-narco-terrorist state requires comprehension of the multiple, overlapping loyalties and motivations of the combatants who do not wear uniforms and do not serve a centralized authority.  While the U.S foresees the endgame as a sovereign, if decentralized but not internecine state, the policy assumption is that “the enemy” is also fighting to establish a state, perhaps an “Islamic republic” and sponsor or terrorism, but still a state.   And in spite of being the poster child for mismatching people and political system, there’s little likelihood that anything but some form of sovereign state(s) with an attempt at centralized governance will be part of what comes next for this territory and its inhabitants.  Whether war among the people of Afghanistan can be contained and peace established by the ultimately negotiated government(s) is a very open question, mostly because the very structure established is still at odds with the loyalties and identities of significant portions of the population.

By now we have met Clausewitz’s Trinitarian conceptualization of war (people/military/government corresponding to the nature/conduct/purpose of war) and we’ve been introduced to the neo-medieval assertion that Clausewitz’s train of thought is mired in the state-centric past, irrelevant to the military strategies required for post-Westphalian/post-modern warfare. Some like to refer to Fourth Generation Warfare (which has its dissenters).

Next we’ll take a look at two perspectives on the war in Afghanistan that I find illustrative of how these concepts translate on the ground.

Part One: The Wondrous Trinity

After that rather ostentatious introduction, let’s move on to our basic concepts before applying them, and testing them, keeping in mind that the application of Clausewitz is always fraught with peril, so these are all just introductory ideas that I am exploring and may shape up over time in a more scholarly manner.  At this stage I’m mostly cherry-picking key Clausewitzian concepts and determining their applicability to 21^st century conflict and in particular to the Afghan context.  There is a large and fascinating scholarly literature debating this notion. I’ll be referencing some of this scholarship though, again, this blog is not intended to produce full scale scholarly treatment, rather to incubate ideas I hope people find interesting and helpful.  I’ll get a bibliography together soon.

As a reminder, the two concepts driving my analysis are (1) Clausewitz’s (paradoxical) Trinitarian warfare and (2) the neo-medievalism defining key areas of the international system, as opposed to the Westphalian, state-centric system that continues to be the dominant paradigm among great power policymakers.  Each establishes a context within which individuals and institutions operate with emphasis on political and military matters. The question is about their compatibility (or lack thereof), and the degree to which (in)compatibility between the two is determining the events and trajectory of the war in Afghanistan.

If I were to identify one truly fundamental principle underlying On War, in spite of the ongoing debates over translating and interpreting and applying Clausewitz, it would be the unpredictability of war.  It is the changing nature of war that inevitably conflicts with the strategists’ expectations.  As Clausewitz points out, it’s not just the skin-deep alterations of a chameleon we’re talking about.  Rather, often changes twist and turn at variable speed with outcomes indicating change in the very nature of war, confounding commanders and their political masters confronted with a new generation of warfare.

Trinitarianism – what I hereby define as the belief that there is an objective, singularly correct interpretation of Clausewitz’s discussion of three interdependent factors that comprise the sovereign engagement in warfare.  I’m not throwing my hat into that ring, rather, since there are close similarities among the translations and interpretations, I’ll go along with Air Force Col. Larry D. New, who published a succinct summary and analysis of the contemporary relevance of Clausewitz’s trinity in Air Power Journal in 1996

Trinitarian war consists of  “the inherent linkage between the nature of war, the purpose of war, and the conduct of war. Clausewitz called this linkage a paradoxical trinity with three aspects: the people, the commander and his army, and the government.³ The people have to do with the nature of war, the military with the conduct of war, and the government with the purpose of war. This paper addresses how Clausewitzian theory applies to America's recent history and how the theory that holds true may be applied to future situations in which the military instrument is considered or used in foreign policy.” (New 1996)

What this useful summary skips over are the many discussions of exactly how Clausewitz stated these propositions, with considerable discussion of the emotion indeed, rage, of the people, the chaos of the battlefield and the necessary creativity of the combatants, and the problematic assumption that the policy that is determining military action is rational and not subject to political calculations, though Clausewitz (an experienced officer) knew better, as mentioned in this analysis of the trinity's relevance to the killing of Osama bin Laden.

As quoted and elaborated upon by Col. New in Air Power Journal: The trinity is “composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason....” (emphasis added). This set of elements is usually labeled

‘emotion/chance/reason’; sometimes “violence/chance & probability/rational calculation”; or, even more abstractly, “irrationality/nonrationality/rationality.”

Let’s just stick with the nature of war, the conduct of war, and the purpose of war as linked, respectively, to the people, the combatants, and the government.  Tomorrow I address the second contextual variable, the neo-medieval challenge to the sovereign state system and thus to policies made from that perspective.

The Friction and Fog of War

One fun moment at Carlisle Barracks last month was having my photo taken with the bust of Clausewitz.
Also notable was the number of times the great war theorist's name was evoked, including an acknowledgment that the mention was as much because it's simply de rigeur to do so as the fact that Clausewitz was a good fit with the discussion.  His insight into the differences between war in theory/on paper/as planned and the reality of war are relevant still, perhaps more so than in some time.  One condition for applying conceptually (and operationally) insightful thinkers such as Clausewitz to current conditions is that we must expand the battlespace conceptually and geospatially.  Conceptually, we're living in what some call a new medievalism (not without dissent) with "marked by multiple and overlapping sovereignties and identities."  However, whether a traditional sovereign state, a multinational corporation, a tribal hierarchy, a terrorist organization or a suicide bomber, the rational actor assumption that underlies Clausewitz's (and most such, except for those who don't) theories applies across the board.  Geospatially, the battlespace is defined in practically every way imaginable -- from the varied and difficult terrain of Afghanistan to drone "pilots" in Arizona to space-based assets to cyberspace.  To summarize, what I'm introducing is a look at the friction and fog of war as discussed by Clausewitz but applied as indicative of neo-medievalism in the Afghan zone of conflict.  Put another way, I seek to provide a Clausewitzian analysis of the Afghan theater though the prism of the great Hedley Bull's concept of neo-medievalism, proposing that neo-medievalism is a primary source of the Clausewitizian frictions clouding both the conduct and analysis of the war effort.  This will comprise my entries over the next few days.

In the Garden of IRAM

Current reporting seems to point to an Improvised Rocket Assisted Mortar, IRAM, as the likely projectile that brought down the Chinook on August 6. If accurate, this lends more credence to the suspicion of Iran as having a role in this attack.  The use of IRAMs, sometimes called "flying IEDs", was brought to the fore by The Long War Journal: the IRAM looks to be a large canister, perhaps a propane or fuel tank, filled with explosives and propelled by 107mm rocket booster. These types of improvised weapons -- essentially flying IEDs -- would have a short range and would be highly inaccurate. Read more: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/06/mahdi_army_uses_flyi.php .  If accurate, this news strengthens the argument for Iranian involvement.  The IRAMs used in Iraq are thought to be Iranian made and a favorite of the Mahdi Army led by Moqtada al-Sadr, whose ties to Iran are well known.  

As an aside for those interested in wordplay, Iram means Heaven in Arabic (Eram in Persian), and often refers to a garden near Shiraz, Iran.   Iram is also a popular name today and in the Qu'ran was a grandson of the Prophet Nuh and founded the city of 'Ad sometimes known as the Atlantis of the Sands

NCTC Interactive Calendar

I'd like to call attention to a great resource provided by the National Counter Terrorism Center, called the NCTC Counterterrorism Calendar, which provides interactive geographic and chronological information on terrorist groups and related events.  Here is the link.  Thanks to Jenni Hesterman and her Counter Terror Forum at http://jennihesterman.blogspot.com/ who is also my supervisor at American Military University (where I'm adjunct instructor).

Learning lessons from tragedies

In 2003, the threats to military helicopters in previous and current wars were highlighted here.  Recent advances have been encouraging, though most work seems to be focused on protecting the primary targets of RPG launchers, i.e., tanks, armored personnel carriers and other military vehicles.  Thus far reporting remains consistent that this week's Chinook was brought down by RPG fire, which is likely given the circumstances (reports conflict as to whether the copter was landing or taking off, but either way it was seemingly not in a position and was possibly overloaded for evasive maneuvers) and the size and shape of the CH-47.  Indeed,  in a lesser reported event due to the low casualties (2 injured) as compared to this week's unprecedented death toll, a  Chinook was taken down by RPG fire on July 28, 201l in eastern Afghanistan.

So what is to be done? Three tracks come to mind, at least for the short term -- (1) continue capturing and destroying caches as well as getting control of illicit trafficking and the black market in weapons; (2) adopt proven anti-RPG technology as it becomes available; and (3) derive lessons from the July 28 and August 6 attacks toward preventing future similar attacks.  Over the longer term, I do not expect night raids and other capture/kill exercises to lessen due these Taliban mission successes, which is not to say nothing will change -- first we need more information as we await further news on the investigation into the attack. 

The RPGs of August

I'll get to a few thoughts on the US Army War College's 6th Strategy Implementation Strategy in just a bit.  Today we awoke to news of a singularly deadly event in our ten year war in Afghanistan.  The great upticks in personnel and operations by Special Operations Forces (SOFs) in Afghanistan over the past couple of years increased the probability of higher casualties among SOFs, but to lose around 20 -- nearly 10% of the SEAL Team Six (DevGru) total members -- in one event is a great blow.  One of many summary articles based on knowledge as of this writing can be found here and for a recent overview of Special Operations Forces, see this 21 page report of the Congressional Research Service.


As stated in the Washington Post article posted above, this tragic event will not precipitate change in the counter-insurgency strategy that is highly dependent on SOFs.  This is not to say that the strategy isn't undergoing change, but it's the looming withdrawals of U.S. and international forces over the next couple of years that will indicate such change.

It is interesting that the weapon of choice -- or, more likely, of necessity -- was an RPG launcher rather than more traditional anti-aircraft weaponry.  Indeed, U.S. officials have downplayed the amount of information known so far about the attack, citing ongoing investigative work. It will be interesting to watch this play out, keeping in mind the controversy over a downing of a U.S. Chinook nicknamed Flipper over Helmand in 2007.  According to reporting in the Guardian's War Logs, U.S. officials reported an RPG as the culprit, while a NATO spokesperson was stating that "It's not possible for small-arms fire to bring down a helicopter."  Rather, a shoulder-fired anti-aircraft rocket launcher was the more likely successful weapon, allegedly sourced from Algeria through Iran into Afghanistan (according to anonymous, unconfirmed information culled from Wikileaks).  I encourage you to read this and other Guardian War Logs and decide for yourself on the utility of the information therein; after all, even for the enormity of the Wikileaks info-dumps, they still provide snapshots of their given subjects, numerous and larger shapshots, but with definite boundaries.  One point should be made here regarding the NATO spokesperson's quote above about small-arms fire:  Apaches, Blackhawks, and (most vulnerable) Chinooks have all been taken down by RPGs, though of course most helicopter crashes are from mechanical or human error as well as weather.  I did a bit of research today, just a quick muck in data provided through DoD Press Releases.  The data clearly show the challenges presented by the proliferation of Rocket Propelled Grenades:

Data: RPGs and related captured by U.S. and coalition forces.
Source: DoD News Releases; any errors are mine.
To July 2011:    Not comprehensive. Focused on Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) almost exclusively; many other weapons and types of ammo were also recovered, as well as narcotics.

An April 8 report on captures since the beginning of 2011 summarized the following: 32,000 lbs ammonium nitrate, 40 lbs magnesium, 5550 ft detonation cord/wire, 400 mortar rounds, 150 landmines, 400 hand grenades, 60 RPG launchers, 260 RPG rounds, 200 pressure plates (for use on RPGs).

Some details on RPGs:
Jan 8    S/E Af                                                         9 RPGs
Feb 9    Panjwa'i District, Kandahar Province        26 RPG motors
Feb 9    Arghandab District, Kandahar Province     7 RPG warheads
Feb 11                                                                118 RPG warheads, 31 RPGs
Mar 8    S Af                                                          5 RPG boosters, 1 RPG launcher
Mar 9    Tagab District, Kapisa Province                 1 RPG
Mar 9    Sangia District, Helman Province                1 RPG, 1 anti-tank weapon,
Mar 9    Mehtar Lam District, Laghman Prov         33 RPGs, 9 anti-personnel mines
Mar 10  Sabari District, Khost Province Capture Haqqani bomb facilitator -- financial, media,  
logistical support, including transport of mines, RPGs, etc.

Apr 8    Andar District, Ghazni Province                   3 RPG rounds, 3 RPG launchers
Apr 8    Helmand & Uruzgan Provinces                    2 RPG launchers
Apr 9    Arghandab District, Kandahar Prov             9 RPGs
Apr 9    Zurmat District, Paktiya Province                1 RPG
Apr 10    Paghman District, Kabul Province           22 RPG rounds
Apr 11    Qarghahi District, Laghman Province   RPG fire on U.S. forces
Apr 11    Ghazni Province                                     16 RPGs
Apr 12    Uruzgan, Kandahar & Helmand Prov       4 RPG rounds
May 6    Logar Province                                       20 RPGs, 2 RPG launchers (also ANA                                 and U.S. Army uniforms)
May 7    Barfak District, Baghram Province            1 RPG, multiple rounds ammo
May 7    Several areas summed                          132 artillery projectiles, 10 RPG launchers;                                                                                                    2 mortars, 1 RPG round                                                                          550 lbs marijuana
                                                                           80 lbs black tar heroin &
                                                                           30 lbs crushed cold medicine

May 11    Ahmadabad District, Paktiya Prov       15 RPGs, 3 RPG boosters
June 6    Baghran District, Helmand Prov             70 anti-personnel mines, 3 RPG                                                                                                                         launchers, 15 RPGs, 22 lbs opium
June 7    Washer District, Helmand Province        10 RPGs
July 8    Muhammad Aghah District, Logar Prov    2 RPGs, 600 heavy machine gun rounds

Regardless.....


The first question that came to mind regarded the origins of the Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) fire that reportedly brought down the Chinook.  The hand of Iran is certainly a possible avenue to explore, and should Iranian culpability be established, we can expect a continued refocusing of our regional strategy toward Iran as Afghanistan fades from view.  Put another way, containing violence in post-OEF Afghanistan will require containing Iran's persistent efforts to exploit regional instabilities.  Earlier this year Iran released from house arrest senior al Qaeda leaders and members of Osama bin Laden's family.  The release was reportedly negotiated by Sirajuddin Haqqani of the highly influential Haqqani network in Afghanistan. Reflect on this news reported in the Kuwait publication Al-Watan, then consider this possibly very prescient analysis in the May 7, 2011 issue of The Military Balance, a highly respected publication: "Iran has for some time been supplying training, weapons and money to the Afghan Taliban as a relatively low risk way of sustaining pressure on the United States. The release of senior and experienced al-Qaeda leaders suggest that Iran may have decided to up the ante" (emphasis mine; The Military Balance 111 1:1, p. 12).



Another possible foreign hand behind the attack, or at least behind part of it such as supply, logistics and especially intelligence is the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).  Perhaps it's just low-hanging fruit, but it is difficult to overlook who was attacked -- as has been reported over and again, Seal Team Six, the unit responsible for killing OBL to the humiliation of the ISI.  Of course, this is but one layer of many among the 
ties between the ISI and the Afghan insurgency.

At this point, investigations and reprisals that we may never know about must go on before we can further analyze the situation.  The number of SOFs on the copter and the very use of the Chinook for this operation have been questioned, but at this point speculation is the best anyone can do.